What is it that makes humans human? As science and technology challenge the boundaries between life and non-life, between organic and inorganic, this ancient question is more timely than ever. Acclaimed object-oriented philosopher Timothy Morton invites us to consider this philosophical issue as eminently political. In our relationship with nonhumans, we decide the fate of our humanity.
Reason at Work is designed for Introduction to Philosophy courses where the instructor prefers to use a collection of readings to introduce the broad divisions of the discipline. This edition includes sixty-two readings organized into the six major branches of philosophical inquiry: Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion, and Philosophy of Mind.
Social ideals: Justice, A utilitarian theory of justice /โ J.S. Mill, Egalitarianism with changed motivation /โ G. Cohen; Equality, Multidimensional equality /โ M. Walzer, Equality of capacity /โ A. Sen; Liberty, rights, property, and self-ownership, A defense of the primacy of liberty rights /โ L. Lomasky, Atomism and the primacy of rights /โ C. Taylor -- Social institutions: Education, Educating about familial values /โ W. Galston, For vouchers and parental choice /โ M. Friedman; Family, In defense of filial obligations /โ C.H.
Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory is an outstanding anthology of the most important topics, theories and debates in ethics, compiled by one of the leading experts in the field. It includes sixty-six extracts covering the central domains of ethics:
This book offers a new and compelling account of distributive justice and its relation to choice. Unlike luck egalitarians, who treat unchosen differences in people's circumstances as sources of unjust inequality to be overcome, Sher views such differences as pervasive and unavoidable features of the human situation. Appealing to an original account of what makes us moral equals, he argues that our interest in successfully negotiating life's ever-shifting contingencies is more basic than our interest in achieving any more specific goals.
To be responsible for their acts, agents must both perform those acts voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the epistemic condition has received far less attention. In Who Knew? George Sher seeks to rectify that imbalance. The book is divided in two halves, the first of which criticizes a popular but inadequate way of understanding the epistemic condition, while the second seeks to develop a more adequate alternative.
Blame is an unpopular and neglected notion: it goes against the grain of a therapeutically-oriented culture and has received relatively little philosophical attention. This book discusses questions about its nature, normative status, and relation to character. The book's most important conclusion is that blame is inseparable from morality itself.